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 Abstract 
 
The capacity to love is without a doubt one of the most prized features of our existence. 
However, love offers us a wide range of complex questions with very few answers. Yet, it is 
important that we get an accurate view of love because knowing what to love and how to live 
aids us in trying to manage our lives sensibly. In this paper, I plan to present a reasons-
responsive account of romantic love that involves the valuing of qualities that the beloved has as 
well as the valuing of the relationship shared with the beloved. I will also show how my account 
of romantic love accommodates our desire for stability—that is, constancy and exclusivity—in 
romantic relationships. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction: A Brief History and 
Framework for Romantic Love 
 The capacity to love is without a doubt one of the most prized features of our existence. 
However, love offers us a wide range of complex questions with very few answers. Yet, it is 
important that we get an accurate view of love because knowing what to love and how to live 
aids us in trying to manage our lives sensibly.
1
 It has also been suggested that in order to ask 
normative questions most perspicuously, one could use a maximal theory of what love is.
2
 Too 
often, the necessity of theorizing about love is easily overlooked. It seems to get lost in the 
philosophical shuffle because of some perceived lack of importance. However, theorizing about 
love is rewarding because the study of love is practical, it has close ties with questions about 
purpose and living rationally. Love contributes largely to the establishing of final ends in our 
lives. 
 Inevitably, we are creatures that cannot avoid being active. As such, it is important to 
have ends and aims because they give our otherwise meaningless activity purpose. Loving helps 
make our activity useful. It serves as a worthwhile goal and a final end. Harry Frankfurt says, 
“living without goals or purposes is living with nothing to do.”3 This is indeed a concern. For, 
surely, such an existence for active creatures like us will ultimately lead to an unavoidable 
decline of psychological activity—lest, we will literally bore ourselves to death! So, it is our 
                                                 
1
 Frankfurt (2004). 
2
 Sircello (1989), p. 167. 
3
 Frankfurt (1988), p. 84. 
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responsibility to avoid such boredom. If we do not consider the mystery of love and try to get 
clear on it, we may be denied an essential element in personal growth. Since rationality and the 
capacity to love are quite possibly the most emblematic and highly prized features of human 
nature, it makes sense that human reason should be employed to help map out the depths of love. 
But what are we doing when we theorize about love? What we are concerned with when we 
theorize about love is conceptualizing the phenomenon already enjoyed so that the resultant 
concepts reflect light back on the dark mystery itself.  
With these considerations in mind, the importance of theorizing about love becomes 
clear. We realize that we are not taking up some aimless metaphysical pursuit. Instead, we are 
recognizing an often bypassed necessity. There is some urgency here and it is important that we 
get clear on what the nature of love consists. 
 In this paper, I plan to present a reasons-responsive account of romantic love that 
involves the valuing of qualities that the beloved has as well as the valuing of the relationship 
shared with the beloved. I will also show how my account of romantic love accommodates our 
desire for stability—that is, constancy and exclusivity—in romantic relationships.  
 
Two Types of Love 
 There is an important question that takes hold of philosophers who theorize about love—
namely, is there a single set of ideas that can accurately depict everything that we have come to 
call love? I doubt that there is a set capable of accomplishing this task. Love is properly broken 
down into at least two types—Agapic and Eros. The notion of agapic love comes from the Greek 
word Agape (αγάπη) which, in a general sense, means the love that one has for human kind. The 
ancient Greeks believed that this type of love was the unselfish love of one person for another 
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person without sexual implications. Eros (έρωτας), also derived from the Greek, is generally 
construed as a physical love having to do with, in most cases, some element of sexual desire. The 
Greeks also indentified this term with their mythological god of love. The Romans later 
identified the term eros with the naked, infant boy with wings known as Cupid. It is a variation 
of this type of love that contemporary love scholars have come to call “romantic” love. 
 
Agapic Love 
 In Love and Beauty, Guy Sircello acknowledges the distinction between the types of love. 
In doing so, he introduces the idea of tribal love. Tribal love pertains to the love between family 
members or a love between all persons. Sircello says that this type of love may in part be 
constituted by the love for the qualities of the beloved, but nevertheless there is a nucleus to the 
love where the love of their qualities is irrelevant.
4
 Sircello’s notion of tribal love carefully 
unpacks what we mean when we talk about agapic love. Agapic love, much like Sircello’s tribal 
love, is independent not only of whether the beloved has lovable qualities but also of whether the 
beloved returns the love. 
 This love appears to consist in acting in accordance with certain obligations. Such an 
obligation, we might say, would be of a mother to provide care, concern, or even the material 
support for a child as well as the obligation of the child to behave respectfully and gratefully 
towards their parent. That is, this is the love that is obligatory or that is felt by people as 
obligatory.
5
 
                                                 
4
 Sircello (1989), p.167. 
5
 Ibid. 
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 In regard to things like familial love, we have intuitions that suggest that our love perhaps 
leads us to act in accordance with some obligations that we might have. Also, in this regard, we 
have intuitions that suggest that our love is not based on the qualities possessed by the beloved. 
Surely, we typically think something is wrong with people who place conditions on loving their 
children or those who think that their children are not worthy or deserving of their love. They 
often seem nefarious in some way. But we do not think this is the case with romantic love. 
 There is an obvious sense of importance that agapic love brings with it. In this notion lie 
some deep implications for the society in which we are all a part. The respect and love that we 
put forth for each of the members in our societal community helps us maintain the hope that such 
ideals like peace or harmony might be achieved. It is the underlying force driving our pursuits of 
such things. These things have intrinsic value and are thereby worthy of our pursuits. The 
unselfish love of one person for another person brings to mind the perfect love of God for human 
kind, such that by our partaking in loving agapically, we become better people for it. 
 
Romantic Love 
 I doubt that one system of ideas can define everything in literature or culture that has 
been referred to as romantic. This is, I take it, because the notion of “romanticism” or that which 
is romantic, has been diluted through its use in a wide variety of media whether it be popular 
culture, philosophical texts, or other literary works. The word “romantic” was introduced by 
German poets and philosophers in the 19
th
 century to capture and signify the world view that 
they were in the act of creating. Around this same time, the idea of the romantic reawakened the 
idea of true love being an ideal relationship that appeared in the empirical world. The thing that 
distinguished romanticism from earlier forms of idealism was its emphasis on feeling rather than 
5 
 
 
reason. We come to understand the severity of this shift when we consider the fact that 
throughout the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, world views were dominated by reason due to the 
burgeoning of scientific discovery throughout the scientific revolution. Romantics do not believe 
that feeling is all but rather that feeling is primary, both in morals and in the acquisition of 
knowledge about the world.
6
 In fact, most romantics thought that love enabled us to know and 
appropriate the universe by means of endless yearning for oneness with another person or with 
humanity or with the cosmos as a whole.
7
 
 For our considerations here, the concept of romantic is closely tied to the ancient Greek 
notion of eros. Our focus will be on the type of love that occurs between nonrelated persons 
usually with an element of sexual desire present. This is the love most often associated with 
romantic relationships and marriages under the contemporary paradigm. This love brings with it 
questions that are both important and difficult. These questions include: Is romantic love 
valuable? Is it important that we love romantically? What is the nature of romantic love? What or 
whom is right to love? Under what conditions? Which loves are better or worse? What role, if 
any, does loving play in how we live? These questions, along with various others, contribute to 
the viscous haze surrounding romantic love. However, I reassure you that the efforts put forth in 
this project will not be in vain. Our inquiry here shall constitute a step toward removing some of 
that haziness so that we might be better able to understand ourselves and the world around us. 
 From its introduction in the 19
th
 century, the notion of the romantic has represented a 
divorce from reason which preceded it in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. As we have moved through 
time, the gap between love and reason has expanded and has become so augmented that we have 
                                                 
6
 Singer (1984), p. 286. 
7
 Ibid. 
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been deluded to thinking that the two have nothing to do with one another. Love is unreasonable, 
we say. I suggest that they are more intricately tied together than we think. So, it is one primary 
goal of this project to illuminate that very relationship; that is, to salvage the relationship 
between love and reason. 
 Of the going views on romantic love, I am sympathetic to the view that that posits 
romantic love as reason-responsive to an appraisal of value. The view primarily holds that love 
involves the valuation and appreciation of a person’s loveable qualities. Additionally, I believe 
that the nature of romantic love involves the valuation and appreciation of the relationship itself. 
It has been said that this view has at least two unfavorable consequences: (1) The unreasonable 
consequence that we should end our romantic relationships when the qualities of the beloved or 
the relationship with the beloved changes, and (2) the unreasonable consequence that if another 
particular person is a better fit with the qualities that we esteem than is our beloved, then we 
should trade up or exchange our beloved for that person.  Primarily, these concerns are for the 
stability in our romantic relationships. These concerns are the most pressing, so it will be these 
concerns that we shall consider for our laboring here. 
 In the next chapter, we will examine the account of romantic love that I am sympathetic 
to. We will unpack, in detail, what I take to be involved in romantic love. This includes the 
valuation and the appreciation of a person’s qualities. We then move to the appreciation of 
relationships. After doing this we will see what I best take to be the nature of romantic love. It 
will be important to establish a solid foundation on what this view involves so that the rest of our 
theorizing will be less precarious. 
 In chapter three, we consider the stability of our romantic relationships. We will also 
explore the constituent parts of stability—constancy and exclusivity. In doing so, we will 
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examine the concerns regarding stability for the reason-responsive account of love. We will 
consider unreasonable consequences that the reason-responsive account is said to imply. 
 
 
Love: The Framework 
 There are some widespread assumptions that will help guide our inquiry. These 
assumptions are, in my estimation, uncontroversial and should thus be employed here to aid us in 
our deliberative process of trying to conceptually analyze romantic love. 
 The first of these is that romantic love is monogamous. That is, the types of relationships 
that we typically regard as loving ones involve two people. I realize that there are some cultures 
that practice polygamy. However, relative to the western cultural practices we have come to 
accept, more times than not, that romantic relationships involves two people. This notion of 
monogamy is contrary to the nature of man since the “fundamental instincts of man suggest to 
him self-preservation, and in its larger sense, this means species preservation.”8 What Elinor 
Glyn is suggesting here is that the instincts of man suggest to him to preserve his species by 
whatever means. It is implied that the most effective way of doing so might be to mate and 
reproduce as many times or with as many people as one sees fit. We fight these natural urges, 
however, so that the conditions of love might be met and that we enjoy the fruits that it produces. 
 Next, romantic love involves some level of commitment that is expected to persist 
through time. Under the framework we are constructing here, one that, again, corresponds to 
western cultural practices, romantic love usually involves the assumption that the participants 
                                                 
8
 Glyn (1923), p. 21-22. 
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have the intention of being in a long-term committed relationship, with marriage as the 
contemporary paradigm, between two people for the extent of their lives. 
 Last, it is often assumed that love is egalitarian. All people possess the ability to love and 
to be loved romantically. Finally, it should be mentioned that the account of love that I submit 
here is a secular one. Although people sometimes have religious or spiritual elements in their 
romantic relationships, this account does not depend on either of these things. I presume that the 
account to be offered holds for individuals in a free society for which there is a cultural ideal for 
romantic relationships. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Nature of Romantic Love 
 In recent years, philosophers have not had much nice to say about reason-responsiveness 
accounts of love. For whatever reason, they do not appreciate the tremendous explanatory power 
possessed by these accounts. Of course explanatory power is no definitive reason to accept an 
account of love. But I also take these accounts to actually depict the nature of romantic love. In 
this chapter, I wish to first consider Harry Frankfurt’s discussion on final ends and the role of 
love in our lives. Shortly thereafter, I will present the reason-responsiveness account of romantic 
love that I am sympathetic to. This account involves the valuation of a person’s qualities. 
Additionally, my account conjoins a traditional quality account of love and another reason-
responsiveness account of romantic love that deals with relational properties presented by Niko 
Kolodny. 
 My quality account shares striking similarities with Kolodny’s relationship account. One 
element that I want to maintain, however, is the element that involves the actual valuation of 
qualities had by the beloved. Kolodny jettisons this idea. However, I think that it helps create a 
more reasonable picture of how it is that we come to enter in to our romantic relationships. 
 
Frankfurt on the Necessity of Ideals and Final Ends 
 Philosophers have long exhausted the discussion of the distinction between means and 
ends. This is with good reason. The distinction between means and ends helps us organize our 
thoughts concerning what we do. For Harry Frankfurt, the notion of an arrangement of ends and 
means “focuses quite naturally on the ways in which our goals are linked to the process of 
10 
 
 
reasoning by which we attempt to determine how to achieve them.”9 But what, exactly, is the 
distinction between means and ends? I submit, with Frankfurt, that these concepts are best 
understood through conceptualizing the relation they have to one another. Means, we may say, 
possess value of a certain kind. Means possess instrumental value. That is to say that means 
receive their value through the relation in which they stand to some end external to themselves. 
When considering what ends are, we should consider the desirability something has apart from 
its usefulness as means to other things.
10
 An object that is an end, then, is desirable for its own 
sake. But, it does us no good to have conceptualized these things without examining how they 
are integrated into the routines of our lives. Plainly put, what is the point of having final ends? 
 Inevitably, we are creatures that cannot avoid being active. As such, it is important to 
have ends or aims because they give our otherwise meaningless activities purpose. Frankfurt 
holds that activity without aims is purposeless. He says that “the most obvious reason for having 
goals [is] the fact that it is important to us that certain possible states of affairs come about and 
that others be avoided…[thus], it is undesirable to behave at random [and without purpose].”11 
 Frankfurt offers another reason for having ends—namely, that having final ends increases 
the likelihood that we will do something that we want.
12
 This is because if we are not equipped 
with an aim or goal for which our activity seeks, it is not clear that we want anything at all. 
When we aim at something it makes it important to us that we obtain it. When we do not hit our 
aims, we often feel disappointed or saddened. When we have goals for which our activity aims, 
                                                 
9
 Frankfurt (1999), p. 82. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid, p. 84. 
12
 Ibid. 
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our activity becomes filled with meaning and thus, filled with purpose. So, having ends is a 
necessary condition for engaging in useful activity. Frankfurt says, “Without ends, there are no 
means. And if no activity serves as means, then no activity is useful. Thus having a final end is a 
condition of engaging in useful activity.”13 So, when our activities are infused with purpose, they 
provide our lives with meaning and thus give us a sense of importance. It is this importance, I 
believe, that is central. 
 A person who cares about something regards that thing as important to him. Frankfurt 
insists that to care about anything, or to regard it as important to oneself, means being motivated 
by concern for it. The concern may be positive or negative: hatred or love, a desire to possess or 
a desire to avoid, an interest in sustaining the object or destroying it.
14
 So we are motivated by 
things that we regard as important. By having final ends that are purpose providing, we are 
motivated to act in such a way as to attain and further that end. 
 What are we to make of those to whom nothing is important? This question is indeed 
troublesome. I am not sure that a person could find nothing important. But let us suppose, with 
Frankfurt, that there is someone to whom nothing is important. This person has no basis by 
which to decide that something is important to him. If it is really true that he cares about nothing, 
then it is not possible for him to make any reasoned decision to care about anything.
15
 Finding 
things important is an indispensible condition if we are to conduct our lives meaningfully. 
 Now that we have arrived at the reason for having final ends, it makes sense to ask what 
we should decide on as final ends. When deciding on final ends we need to determine the 
                                                 
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Ibid, p. 93. 
15
 Ibid. 
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importance of the proposed final end.
16
 It is imperative that what we decide on as final ends 
make a non-trivial difference. Frankfurt calls these non-trivial difference-making things “ideals.” 
He says that ideals are an appropriate candidate for final ends because they constrain us in a 
certain way. “A person’s ideals,” he says, “are concerns that he cannot bring himself to betray.”17 
This sort of constraint is a good one. The sort of constraints ideals place on us are supposed to 
aid us in the pursuit of that ideal; acting in order to attain and further that ideal. Now, the ideals 
that define the essential nature of a person need not be moral ideals, in the sense in which 
morality is especially a matter of how a person relates himself to the interests of others. This 
leaves open what characteristics an ideal must possess to serve the function of limiting a person 
and specifying his identity.
18
 
Two of the most compelling ideals in our culture are romantic love itself and stability in 
our romantic relationships. That is, we often find the pursuit of these ideals worthwhile. We let 
the pursuit of these ideals constrain us in a certain way because they provide us with aims and 
thus give us purpose and helps make our lives, our romantic relationships important and more 
meaningful. Indeed it is not just romantic love in the abstract that is a final end for us, but our 
lovers themselves are final ends for us as well. We understand that it is not just relationships that 
are of importance to us but the particular people who we find ourselves in relationships with are 
just as important as the relationship itself. 
 
The Nature of Romantic Love 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, p. 92. 
17
 Ibid, p. 114. 
18
 Ibid, p. 115. 
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 When it comes to romantic love, we often look for some justification behind the love that 
our lovers say that they have for us. That is, romantic love is not merely selective, a matter of 
choosing to love one person rather than another, but it is rather a matter of selecting for better or 
worse reasons. To be clear, the questions about justifying love are not questions about whether or 
not love is a good thing or a bad thing; it is rather about particular loves for particular persons. 
The questions “Why do you love me?” or “What is it that you love about me?” allude to 
the fact that romantic love does not resist, but it actually invites explanation; and the selection by 
the lover of a beloved not only allows but requires justification—given the large number of 
potential beloveds having valuable properties.
19
 When we typically use the word “love” we 
imply an act of prizing or desiring or caring about. All of these represent a mode of valuation. 
So, we shall now consider the nature of romantic love. On the account I will present, we value 
someone’s qualities. Additionally, as we begin and continue relationships we also, appropriately, 
come to value the relationships themselves. 
It is uncontroversial that there exist emotions that admit to the following characteristics: 
1) If a person x experiences this emotion, then it is possible for x to articulate, 
even if in only a vague sense, what the emotion is about. What the emotion is 
about, or the object of the emotion, is indicated in sentences of the form, ‘x Φs 
y’, or ‘x is Φ about/with/of y’. 
2) If x feels Φ, and y is the object of that emotion, then x will believe y to have a 
certain set of properties or a particular property. Depending on what emotion 
is felt, x will believe that y is harmful, that y has done him a favor, or a 
detriment, etc. 
                                                 
19
 Soble (1990), p. 110. 
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3) So, x will believe and in most cases be able to articulate that y has the 
determinate qualities Ψ and he will believe further that it has the determinable 
quality
20
 Φ because it has the determinate quality Ψ. That is to say if x feels 
the emotion toward some object y then x believes y to have some determinate 
quality that he would normally be able to specify. 
In regard to 3), there are some constraints as to which determinate qualities count in favor of 
particular emotions. What these constraints are, exactly, will be dictated by the relevant 
determinable quality. For instance, if x fears y, then the determinate qualities picked out by x 
must be such that they explain why x takes y to be dangerous.
21
 With this in place, we might 
want to formulate what has been said as follows: if x believes that y is dangerous, then he must 
believe that y is dangerous because it has the relevant determinate qualities, even if on some 
occasions x is unable to articulate these determinate qualities. The point is that what we posit as 
Φ in 1) will set the restricting conditions on what Ψ could be in 3). 
Prima facie, a good reason for questioning whether there are reasons for our romantic 
love is that it is obscure as to what these reasons might be.
22
 Presumably, these conditions 
provide us some grounds as to decide whether an experience of a particular emotion is justified. 
We might not, for example, be justified in having the belief that the object of our emotions is/has 
                                                 
20
 A determinable quality is one that cannot tell us much about how y appears to x because it is 
the type of quality that is supposed to belong to any object of, say, anger or gratitude. (i.e. in the 
case of the experience of the emotion of fear, such a quality might be ‘dangerous’ or ‘fear-able’) 
21
 Taylor (1976), p. 148. 
22
 Kolodny (2003), p. 158. 
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Ψ. If our beliefs about our objects are irrational then we cannot be justified in having an emotion 
based on those beliefs.  
 If x loves y, then it can be said that x believes y has a determinable quality of loveable. 
Simply put, if x loves y, then x holds the belief that y is loveable. However, as Gabriele Taylor 
points out, this might be unsatisfactory. She says:  
There are, after all, criteria for settling, at least in the paradigm cases, whether or 
not a person is loveable, just as there are criteria for settling by and large what 
sorts of situations are dangerous… If this is so and if no more suitable candidate 
can be found than ‘loveable’ can be found, then we have no determinable quality 
to serve as a guide as to what sort of determinate qualities we are to look for in the 
object of love and so what substance to give the love-beliefs.
23
 
 
So if love belongs to the class of emotions described, then it will have a Φ quality that ‘y is Ψ’ 
relates to and Ψ will be relevantly related to love. This is especially so since it appears to me to 
be the case that very often when we love the objects of our love, we do so in virtue of certain 
qualities that we think the object of our love has. But what might these be? 
 Although the choice and variety of loveable qualities may be great, not just any 
description of such belief will do if x is to love y. Additional constraints can be found when we 
consider that when we experience emotions, in addition to the beliefs we have about the object of 
emotion, we also will have wants as well. These wants and beliefs are interrelated in the sense 
that a person will have certain wants because that person has certain beliefs. In this case, why a 
person has a particular want will be explicable in reference to his beliefs. For example, if I 
experience the emotion of fear toward a dog, I also experience the want to, say, leave the area 
where the dog is. If we can specify a set of wants that are usually involved cases where x loves y, 
then this will put a constraint on the beliefs concerning particular qualities in virtue of which x 
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 Taylor (1976), p. 152. 
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can love y. This will allow us to dismiss those which cannot in any way been seen as explanatory 
of the wants in question. But it hardly seems that just any wants will do. So, we need to consider 
the type of want relevant for love. 
 Fortunately enough, in his critique of Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of the will, 
Gary Watson makes an important distinction between merely wanting (or desiring) and valuing. 
Watson espouses a view based on a platonic understanding of the distinction between valuing 
and desiring that depends on there being different sources of motivations.
24
 Like Plato, Watson 
thinks that to value something is to associate that thing with being good. Additionally, he thinks 
that to think a thing good is at the same time to desire it or at least to desire the promotion of it. 
We find the distinction between valuing and desiring, Watson says, in the source of the want or 
why one wants what he does.  
When a person values something, he wants it because he takes it to be worthwhile to 
pursue it even if it is not the most worthwhile thing to have amongst the alternatives. This is 
because it appears valuable in its own right. It is important to note that, since Watson thinks that 
reason determines the value of things, this notion of regarding as worthwhile involves some 
evaluation of the thing that is wanted. Conversely, wants that amount to merely desires are such 
that they might involve no evaluation of the object. When we merely desire, we might think that 
the thing we want has no value, or we might think that the thing we want is in some sense 
worthwhile but only as a means to satisfying another desire. It is the first of these types of wants 
that is relevant to love. This distinction is a non-trivial one for our present discussion. This 
distinction gives us a principled way to evaluate whether a want is the requisite kind of want for 
love or not. From this we are able to distinguish between cases of love and cases of mere 
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 Watson (1975), p. 206-7. 
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infatuation even if the content of a particular want happens to be the same. The primary 
difference is that the type of want ascribed to love demonstrates that the lover values the 
beloved. Whereas in cases of mere infatuation the person merely wants their partners. 
So far on this account, the justification of love is straightforward. Since love is a response 
to an appraisal of value, its justification must be a matter of whether the beloved actually has or 
intelligibly seems to have the value properties relevant to the lover's appraisal or preferences. To 
add to the point, we must come to terms with the fact that the value of the people and things will 
always be a function of human interest. Irving Singer maintains that: 
In all communities people have individual value for one another. We are means to 
each other's satisfactions and we constantly evaluate one another on the basis of 
our individual interest. However subtly, we are always setting prices on other 
people and ourselves.
25
 
 
So to value (and indeed be evaluated) is a feature of human existence. This allows us to look at 
the valuation in love, in spite of many philosophers regarding this sort of process in a negative 
light, as a neutral thing. That is, it is not a good or bad thing; rather it is just what we do. 
So, I have said that when x loves y, this can be explained as the result of y’s having, or x’s 
perceiving that y has, a set Ψ of loveable qualities or characteristics and thus x loves y because y 
has (or x perceives that y has) Ψ.  
 There are some positive corollaries for this account. The first is that love, though 
susceptible to various kinds of irrationality, is not inherently irrational.
26
 So, if x loves y in virtue 
of x’s believing or perceiving that y has Ψ, then love is vulnerable to cognitive mistakes. He may, 
for example, be deluded in his thinking that y has Ψ; x may still love y in this case, though the 
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foundation of that love would be admittedly suspicious. But since romantic love is, in principle, 
explainable in terms of y’s having (or x’s perceiving that y has) Ψ, the love is not irrational at its 
core. It is not “unpatterned, unprincipled, or unpredictable.”27 
 The second corollary is that the object possessing unattractive or undesirable qualities 
must play some role in helping determine the duration and intensity of romantic love. So if y’s 
quality set Ψ changes (made up of qualities that x finds unattractive, undesirable, or unadmirable) 
this might be able to serve as a justificatory force for ending the romantic relationship or for a 
less intense love within that romantic relationship. 
 Unfortunately, the quality account is only able to partially depict the nature of romantic 
love. We additionally value our relationships themselves. So instead of suggesting that it is only 
these determinate qualities that ground romantic love, instead we value our romantic 
relationships and the determinate qualities that a person has. In what comes next, I will present 
the relationship account of love. I will also explain, as best I can, the relationship between the 
relationship theory and the quality theory for which I have so far advocated. 
 
Kolodny and the Relationship Account 
In “Love as Valuing a Relationship”, Niko Kolodny presents an account of love in which 
the love is grounded in the value one has for her relationships. Although the scope of Kolodny’s 
paper reaches questions that pertain to familial and other forms of agapic love, I wish to discuss 
his account only in the context of romantic love. Kolodny starts by briefly pointing to the alleged 
limitations of quality theories. Although he might agree that a person’s qualities may serve as 
reasons for wanting and seeking to cultivate a romantic relationship with them, he says that they 
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are “not reason for the attitudes of…romantic love that sustain the relationship once it is 
cultivated.”28 Kolodny continues, “If Jane’s qualities are what justify my loving her, then that 
justification lapses as she loses those qualities. Insofar as my love is responsive to its reasons, 
therefore, it too ought to lapse as soon as she loses those qualities. Such a fickle attitude hardly 
seems like love.”29 Another limitation of the quality theory, Kolodny thinks, is that if a person’s 
qualities are my reasons for loving her, then they are equally reasons for my loving someone else 
with the same qualities. 
In light of these concerns, many philosophers reject the claim that there are reasons for 
love. Instead, Kolodny’s claim is that the reason for continuing to love our beloveds is our 
relationship to them. Love, moreover, partly consists in the belief that some relationship renders 
it appropriate; the special concern for a person is not love at all when there is no belief that a 
relationship renders it appropriate.
30
 So instances of inappropriate love exist whenever there is 
such a belief, but the belief is false or when a person is misled by someone just using him. 
Consider a stalker, for example. They often believe that they have relationships to the objects of 
their obsession when they really do not. The absence of love is inappropriate when there is a 
relationship that calls for it. I agree with Kolodny’s claims here. But what are relationships under 
my account? 
Relationships are ongoing, with particular people, historical, and reciprocal. Kolodny 
says that relationships persist over time. For, if x is in a romantic relationship with y, we realize 
that the romantic relationship is not the momentary obtaining of some relation, but something 
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that has persisted and may continue to persist over time.
31
 Further, relationships hold between 
particular people through time. That is, relationships are individuated by the identities of their 
participants.
32
 Lastly, he says whether or not I stand in a relationship to someone at a given time 
depends on some fact about our pasts. The claim is that y is x’s girlfriend only if there has been a 
historical pattern of attitudes and actions between us.
33
 This much appears to me to be correct. 
I would add that our romantic relationships also involve romantic contracts. These 
contracts are important. They are what the participants use to gauge the expectations for the 
relationship and for one another on. What I mean by a romantic contract is the mutual 
understanding of the desires and expectations of each lover by one another. The demands of the 
participants entering into a romantic relationship are often shaped by their culture, prior 
experiences, or even frame of mind.
34
 That is, what we desire and expect for our romantic 
relationships might be shaped by our perception of our parent’s relationship or romantic 
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relationships that we have had in the past. I believe these contracts point to the importance of 
courting. 
Courting provides us with the opportunity to understand just what the demands are. 
Although our contemporary society typically refers to the period before formalizing a romantic 
relationship (whether through marriage or some formal recognition between the participants) as 
dating, I find the term to be ambiguous as it may refer to mere ‘outings’ with no intention or 
desire for a romantic relationship. I take ‘courting’ to refer, more specifically, to the period of 
activities prior to the formalization of a romantic relationship where there is the intention to 
develop a romantic relationship. Romantic contracts are why we take time before establishing a 
formal romantic relationship to gather as much information about each other as well as the 
desires and expectations we have for one another and for romantic relationships. Formalizing a 
romantic relationship prematurely—before a sufficient amount of information is gathered in 
order to form a mutually understood contract—often leads to disaster. Further, contemporary 
psychological research suggests that it is only after some time has passed that we are able to 
make reasonable evaluations while courting and thus gauge our expectations sensibly.
35
A 
sensible arrangement of expectations is desired because it decreases the chance that we expect 
things from our partners that they might simply be unable or unwilling to give. When we do 
expect such things, it often gives rise to animosity and resentment. Take, for example, the 
tension usually present in situations when one participant is attention hungry and desires 
excessive time and the other participant is extremely career driven and not so willing to yield 
their time. 
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Problems for our romantic relationships might arise from two things regarding the 
romantic contract: (1) the lack of a mutual understanding of the contract or (2) the intentional 
disregard of the romantic contract. In the case of (1), for instance, if x does not understand that y 
desires exclusivity he might believe, falsely, that his relationship allows certain courses of action 
when it indeed does not. This is a problem for y because if x acts against the courses of actions 
that y believes the relationship dictates to both parties, this causes hostility. The anger and 
animosity y might have for x under these circumstances might be inappropriate if they are 
founded on the belief that x intentionally disregarded the romantic contract to conduct a certain 
course of action. This would not be appropriate because in order for x to form such an intention, 
he would have to know the course of action he took himself to be intentionally defying. Since x 
was unclear on the courses of action dictated to him by his relationship, it is not clear that he 
could form such an intention. As the result of such a misunderstood contract usually awaits a 
disgruntled x, upset with y for what he takes to be inappropriate responses for his course of 
action and a disgruntled y, upset with x for what she takes to be intentional inappropriate 
conduct. But problems for our romantic relationships might also stem from mutually understood 
romantic contracts such as (2) the intentional disregard for our romantic contract. In this case, 
both x and y understand the desires and expectations of each other and their relationship. If x 
were to adopt a course of action that disregarded the romantic contract when it is mutually 
understood, y’s animosity is more appropriate because the belief that the animosity is grounded 
in is true. Also, romantic contracts are why, for instance, if neither x nor y desire sexual 
exclusivity, promiscuity, which is often seen as a detriment to the desire for exclusivity, might be 
possible without the integrity of the romantic love between x and y being compromised. 
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The word relationship might be used in two ways. The first way the word “relationship” 
is used in regard to attitude-dependent relationships is that it “refers to the pattern of concern that 
participants have to one another, for the relationship, and for the pattern of concern itself.”36 The 
other way “relationship” is used refers to the activities characteristic of that relationship. In the 
case of romantic relationships some of these activities might include cohabitation, sharing 
confidences, and having sex with our partners. Kolodny remarks that when people speak of 
ending relationships, they usually mean deciding to stop engaging in those activities: that is, 
deciding to move out or no longer see one another socially.
37
 So when used in this sense the 
relation to the relationship, understood as the pattern of concern and characteristic activities, is 
complex. While one can engage in these activities without the pattern of concern, extended 
voluntary engagement in these activities typically gives rise to it. This seems correct as well. We 
inhabit a “hook-up” culture where promiscuity is not aggressively shunned. When we perpetuate 
the act of “hooking up” voluntarily and continually, feelings and emotions do seem to emerge. 
Kolodny and I agree on the further point that the pattern of concern can also persist without the 
characteristic engagement. He says: 
Most people have ‘old friends’ about whom they care deeply, but with whom they 
rarely have the opportunity to socialize. Nevertheless, the relationship would not 
be a relationship of the relevant type if it was not marked at some point in its 
history by engagement in those activities. And in many cases, ceasing to engage 
in the activities changes the nature of relationship. To the extent that a 
relationship that was once romantic is no longer structured around the expression 
of sexual drives, for example, it may make more sense to view it simply as a 
friendship.
38
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This too appears to be correct. When the types of activities that we used to engage in with a 
particular person stops, the relationship with that person may not stop but both participants often 
realize that something about the relationship is “different.” Consider a couple who regularly 
displays affection in public by holding hands. If one of the two individuals were to abruptly stop 
engaging in that activity, the other individual is often taken aback and concerned that there is 
something wrong with their significant other. 
On the relationship theory, there are reasons for love and these reasons are interpersonal 
relationships. More directly put, love is a kind of valuing. Valuing x in general involves (i) being 
vulnerable to certain emotions regarding x, and (ii) believing that one has reasons both for this 
vulnerability to x and for actions regarding x.
39
 So valuing is also a matter of being disposed to 
have certain emotional responses. As Kolodny points out in a footnote, valuing consists not only 
in a susceptibility to certain emotional responses, but also in certain beliefs: first, the belief that 
something provides reasons for this susceptibility and, second, the belief that something provides 
one with reasons for action.
40
 When we value something instrumentally we value x as a way of 
bringing about or realizing some distinct  or some state of affairs involving  (by causing , 
partly constituting , or being partly constituted by ).41 This is not valuing x finally because we 
see some distinct  as the source of our reasons for valuing x. To value something finally is to 
value it for its own sake. To value x finally is both to value x and to see x as the source of one’s 
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reasons for valuing. In this case, one both (a) is emotionally vulnerable to x and for actions 
regarding x and (b) believes that the source of the reasons is x itself.
42
 
 
Tying things together 
So on the account that I am sympathetic to romantic love, then, involves the valuation of 
the qualities that a person has as well as “a final valuation of a relationship, from the perspective 
of a participant in that relationship, and a nonfinal, noninstrumental
43
 value of one’s 
[beloved].”44 I believe that the first type of valuation (the nonfinal valuation of the qualities that 
a person has) is a necessary additional valuation if what we have to say is to apply exclusively to 
romantic love. Our preferences for qualities are what warrant our desires for a relationship which 
Kolodny thinks warrants our love. Romantic love, in other words, is a response that consists, in 
part, in seeking out and appreciating the qualities that the beloved has to offer. The appreciation 
of these qualities puts us in a position to want to give rise to the activities characteristic of the 
particular patterns of concern associated with romantic relationships. Additionally, I believe, 
with Kolodny, that once these relationships are created and cultivated they give us insistent 
reasons for present concern in our relationships. That is, ceasing to have the relevant kind of 
concern within the context of an established and valuable romantic relationship is inappropriate. 
The presence of either an insistent or a noninsistent reason renders the presence of some 
characteristic response appropriate or reasonable. If the only reason for a response is a 
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noninsistent reason, then while it is reasonable to have the response, it is not unreasonable to fail 
to have it. Insistent reasons require a response, whereas noninsistent reasons leave it optional.   
Kolodny provides a couple instances of this. One can fall out of love in response to a 
belief that one’s partner does not or never did have concern for them. A person’s attitudes can 
change in response to the belief that their lover has failed to act on the reasons that the 
relationship provides, even if the lover still has the concern that constitutes the relationship like 
in the case of cheating. Also, as I shall suggest in the coming chapter, as Kolodny alludes to, 
“there is the psychologically real, but metaphysically vexed phenomenon of no longer 
identifying the person now before [you] with the person with whom once had a relationship.”45 A 
person might also find that they are no longer attracted to the beloved. Participating in the 
characteristic activities no longer engages one. Perhaps this is due to changes in one’s self, in 
what attracts one, or changes in one’s beloved in regard to the features to which one was once 
attracted. To the extent that the relationship is marked by attraction, loss of attraction may mean 
a change in the relationship. It may mean, for example, the end of a specifically romantic 
relationship.
46
 
From what has been offered, it appears that romantic love is rather one sided. But 
romantic relationships are reciprocal. Pursuing and sustaining romantic relationships is not like 
grocery shopping or car shopping. When we are considering our relationships, we also consider 
how appropriate we are for our partners. When we believe that the love in our romantic 
relationships is reciprocated, we believe that the lover finds us appropriate and that we fit their 
evaluations. The fact that we fit our lover’s evaluations also gives us a reason to appreciate them. 
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Further, in showing appreciation for our relationship, we try to see to it that we live up to our 
lover’s expectations. Since relationships are ongoing, the pattern of concern that we have for the 
expectations of the lover and the concern that we have to remain appropriate for our lovers are 
also ongoing. So in valuing our beloved and our relationships we reciprocate romantic love. 
The claim that the appreciation of qualities can be involved in reciprocity is not 
uncommon. Further, the fact that these determinate qualities are nonessential to the object might 
mean that they are not indispensible, however, that does not mean that they are unimportant to 
us. On the contrary, our qualities are important to us. Sometimes we struggle with them. People 
undergo cosmetic surgery if they do not like some physical feature about themselves. For the 
unsatisfied that cannot afford cosmetic surgery, the level of dissatisfaction with a particular 
quality could potentially lead to several internal struggles sometimes to the point of depression. 
To a lesser extreme, some people seek powerful toothpastes to make their teeth brighter. When 
we find that we have the quality of being a liar it disturbs us and we try to effectively bring it 
about that we lose that quality as best we can. We do not always succeed. But this struggle itself, 
whether it prevails or not, suggests that the quality in question matters to us. There are other 
qualities that we might not possess but that we desire to have and take effective steps to bring it 
about that we have that quality. These qualities, too, seem important to us insofar as we are 
willing to make the effective steps to bring it about. We undergo personal pilgrimages sometimes 
in order to become better truth tellers. We buy dye and spend hours applying it to change our 
hair color. Would it be strange, then, to want to be appreciated, on some level, for our possession 
of these qualities? I do not think so.  
In large part, we want to be appreciated for these qualities because in most cases we do 
work to attain them. Often when we compliment others on a particular quality, they are thrilled. 
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Employees are delighted when their bosses make references to their having the quality of being a 
hard worker. So I do not think that it is ridiculous that sometimes we want to be appreciated for 
these qualities because they are qualities that are important to us; qualities that we might find 
valuable in ourselves. When our partners do in fact appreciate the qualities that we have, we see 
the love that they have for us and we understand that it is not whimsical or arbitrary.  So 
although it may appear that the valuation of qualities is rather one-sided, the appreciation that we 
show for these qualities also serves as means for the reciprocity of love in our relationships. 
In the coming chapter I will discuss this account and its corollaries an end that we desire 
for our romantic relationships—stability—which, I take to involve constancy and exclusivity. In 
this discussion I have laid out, as best I could, the nature of romantic love under this account. 
Ultimately, romantic relationships are ongoing patterns of concern partially grounded in the 
appreciation of the qualities of the beloved, and love is a psychological state for which there are 
reasons. One might be reluctant to accept my proposal because there is a concern that this 
account does not meet our starry-eyed expectations. This account of the nature of love, they say, 
is unforgivably shallow. I submit here that this concern is not because the view itself is faulty, 
but rather there may be something awry with our expectations. I reiterate that the worry here is 
not that we are setting the bar too low, but instead we may have set it too high—so high in fact, 
that it has become unrealistic.  
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Chapter 3: 
Stability and Romantic Relationships 
Stability 
 Stability as an ideal for our romantic relationships is widespread in western cultural 
practices. However, the nature of stability in romantic love can be a bit elusive. Since this ideal is 
important to us, we do well to get clear on what this notion involves. So what, then, do we mean 
when we say that stability is a thing that we aim for in our romantic relationships? I submit that 
the type of stability involved in our romantic relationships essentially has two aims or conditions: 
constancy and exclusivity.  
We desire to be loved over time in our romantic relationships. Despite the intuitions of 
some, that loves lasts forever, we can make some sense of this desire. We value security. If love 
lasts over time, we are able to alleviate potential anxieties that might arise from thoughts 
concerning whether our partners will love us next week, next month, or next year. These 
anxieties, when present, often contribute to a sense of insecurity with our relationships, or worse, 
insecurities with ourselves! 
Although many of his accounts in psychology have been left behind, most contemporary 
psychologists do not deny the heavy influence of Sigmund Freud’s developmental psychology, 
more specifically, his idea of object constancy. Freud’s general idea points to our understanding 
that out-of-sight does not mean gone. In an important way, our sense of object constancy propels 
the narratives we have about our lovers when they are away from us.  
When we lack a strong sense of object constancy we usually question our relationship to 
that object in its absence. A weak sense of object constancy is what drives our insecurity in 
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romantic relationships and often can give rise to things like jealousy or excessive attachment. A 
weak sense of object constancy is the reason for our anxiety when we are away from our lovers 
after an argument. It is the unrest we experience when our lovers are being uncharacteristically 
mute and we think they are angry with us. The emotions that are provoked in individuals with a 
weak sense of object constancy resemble an undesirable grief cycle.
47
 We desire constancy in 
our romantic relationships because a failed sense of object constancy means we do not have a 
sense of object permanence. This means that in the absence of our lovers we will often 
experience the emotions that make up a grief state. 
We desire to be loved exclusively for a number of reasons. One such reason is that we 
inhabit a culture where exclusivity and monogamy are held highly and indeed revered. The 
praise attributed to the value of exclusivity by our families, friends, colleagues, and even the 
media creates in us in some cases, and encourages in other cases, the desire for a relationship that 
is exclusively involved. That is, when we receive information about romantic relationships from 
these resources, exclusive relationships are often, although not always, painted in a favorable 
light. Naturally, we hold these relationships fixed in mind as ends for our own personal romantic 
pursuits. 
Another reason we desire exclusivity is that even though we might find all human beings 
to be in themselves valuable, in our romantic relationships we like to feel as if our value is 
increased over the value of all other humans with respect to being loved by our partners, even if 
as it turns out that the value that all humans share is equal. We like to feel special. When we feel 
we are being loved exclusively, this contributes to a great feeling of satisfaction and we often 
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find comfort in this. Over the course of the Olympic games, champions are awarded golden 
medals. We recognize that the medal is especially valuable because it is an exclusive award for a 
particular event. Our desire for being loved exclusively is like this. When we find that we are our 
partner’s “gold medal” we indeed have a feeling of specialty.  
Our desire for exclusivity surfaces also when we realize that the desire we experience for 
wanting to be prized especially in the face of others is derived from this larger desire for 
exclusivity. That it is true that we have the desire to be loved in the face of others has become 
and continues to become evident in the engagement of the culture and its social media venues. 
We are encouraged to place our partners on a pedestal on Valentine’s day. Through the 
availability of marital status options and their display settings on the applications to a vast 
number of social networking sites such as Facebook, we are actually encouraged to proclaim to 
people in our networks—social, professional or otherwise—the love that we have for our one 
and only beloved.   
There is at least one more reason that it appears that we desire to be loved exclusively in 
our romantic relationships and that is because of the limited time and other resources that the 
lover has to give. We can tell from a third person perspective that when these already limited 
time and resources are distributed in more than one romantic relationship, the love present in 
either relationship is substantially less robust; whereas if these resources were concentrated on 
one relationship, it would foster a more rich love in the relationship.  
Sometimes these resources are tangible, such as monetary resources. Sometimes the 
resources are a little less tangible, such as time and energy. Instead of being able to focus all of 
his energy toward solving some problem with the beloved y, x’s energy might be directed toward 
some problem with the beloved z. Usually this satisfies none of the involved parties. I am not 
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suggesting that in the case of concentrated time and energy for either y or z that this guarantees 
x’s being able to solve the problem in that relationship. However, we are more likely to 
empathize with x given his maximal efforts. In other words, his not being able to solve the 
problem in this circumstance would not be for a lack of trying.  
The persistence of love contributes to the alleviation of these desires. It contributes as 
well to a better sense of security with our relationships and ourselves. So, much should be said 
about constancy and exclusivity. 
 
Constancy 
 While the appraisal account of love discussed in Chapter 2 paints a particular picture of 
how we come to love, it is said that on this account, we are faced with the unreasonable 
consequence that the love or the relationship should end when the qualities of the beloved 
change. Niko Kolodny presents the problem as follows “Constancy: If Jane’s qualities are what 
justify my loving her [or my relationship with her], then that justification lapses as soon as she 
loses those qualities. Insofar as my love [or my relationship] is responsive to its reasons, 
therefore, it too ought to lapse as soon as she loses those qualities. Such a fickle attitude hardly 
seems like love.”48 This concern is problematic because what it illustrates appears damaging to 
some intuition we might have. But whether this is a problem or not for the appraisal view 
depends on what we are looking for in regards to constancy. In what follows, I will consider two 
worries about constancy. The first has to do with rejecting the notion that in order for x’s 
emotion to count as love, it should never end. The second is the idea that the reason-responsive 
account of love might recommend short-term loves. I will now consider the first of these. 
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Shakespeare famously suggested in his Sonnet 116 that “love is not which alters when 
alteration it finds.” There is an implicit belief at play here. Shakespeare implicitly believes that 
the constancy condition in love calls for the love lasting forever. However, the role that 
constancy plays in romantic love, prima facie, is a bit vague and unclear. In his book, The 
Structure of Love, Alan Soble says “regarding constancy, the choice is between a restrictive 
notion (x [ought to] always love y) and a fuzzy notion that leaves open the length of time x’s 
emotion should last in order to be love.”49 It is the first notion that is relevant for our concerns 
here since many share this Shakespearean intuition. This notion of constancy, however, is 
overwhelmingly strict. It requires that love should literally last forever. For on this kind of 
constancy, if x begins to love y at a time t1, then x ought to love y at all times after t1; if x’s love 
ends, it had never been love.
50
 We will call this the Strict Constancy Principle. But if the ideal of 
stability is such that it demands exclusivity from us, as I think that it does, this strict notion of 
constancy seems to undermine it. 
 Suppose that x loves y. At some point x stops loving y and loves z. But herein lies the 
problem. If the conditions for this strict notion of constancy hold, he now loves two people 
romantically. Remember, if at any time the love for y ceases—even after the dissipation of their 
romantic relationship—he never loved that person. Thus, intuitively, the exclusivity of x’s love 
for z should be called into question. 
 The reasoning above might be said to be a ploy to salvage some theoretical consistency 
which ultimately leads us to making a normative claim like, we should not think about constancy 
in this sense because it theoretically conflicts with our desire for exclusivity. One might say that, 
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descriptively, love does last forever. But the belief that love lasts forever in the strict sense is not 
plausible even when evaluating it on the descriptive terms I might be said to be ignoring. While 
it may be nice to think that love lasts forever in this way, when we look around at romantic love 
and relationships, it is clear that some come to a halt. That is, there are some relationships that 
end. There are some cases where love—in the romantic sense—ceases. When these things 
happen this strict sense of constancy implies that the merit of whether love ever was present is 
called into question. But what is wrong with saying of x that he once loved y romantically but he 
does not love her romantically any longer? There is no difficulty in saying that x was in love with 
y while he was still in a romantic relationship with y.  
Recall the conditions for the class of emotions love belongs to. Whether or not the 
experience of an emotion is appropriate, in regard to the degree that emotion is experienced, 
depends on the determinate qualities the object has or is perceived to have. So if x fears y, then x 
takes y to have frightening qualities. This means that it is possible for x to fear some z more than 
y. In articulating a more strongly felt emotion toward z, the qualities about the object that x is 
responding to are more frightening in z than in y. However, from this, we should hardly doubt 
that the emotion experienced about y and about z was in fact fear. Some loves are stronger or 
weaker than other loves, indeed. However, the thought that the weak experience of the emotion 
should not count as an experience of the emotion at all seems misguided. Further, since we take 
it to be the case that the experience of an emotion may occur in varying degrees, this gives us a 
reason to appreciate the stronger experiences of love when they occur and in fact hold on to 
them. So it appears this does a better job at accommodating our natural way of speaking about 
such matters. 
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 But perhaps there is something here. Love, as we have said, is broken down into two 
distinct types—eros and agape. Because of this, the modes of love differ depending upon the 
type of love. What we might mean when we advocate for this strict sense of constancy is that 
once love commences, love simpliciter should last forever in this strict sense, lest the love itself 
be called in to question. That is, they might have in mind the distinction that we often make 
reference to in our regular ways of speaking—between (1) loving a person x and (2) being in 
love with a person x. If my interpretation of this principle (strict sense constancy) is correct, they 
will say that once love begins, in either sense (1) or (2), all that the strict sense of constancy says 
is that (1) ought to remain satisfied. So after the love for x begins in sense (1), even if over the 
course of the relationship with x love in sense (2) is acquired, love in sense (1) should remain 
constant. However, this is not problematic for the appraisal view to which I am sympathetic. It is 
no problem for romantic love if the type of love that should be held constant is the love 
mentioned by type (1), this type of love corresponds more to agapic love. Our concern about 
exclusivity is motivated by the thought that there are limited resources with respect to the 
particular mode love is in. 
 For it is not typically problematic for y that if x loves her romantically, that he also loves 
his son, his parents, his sister, or his friend John agapically. This is a different mode. This 
difference of mode is apparent in the type of activities characteristic of the relationships in which 
we find ourselves in relation to the beloved.
51
 Depending on what mode love is in, it is going to 
demand different things from us in regard to our loving relationships. Since we typically to do 
not have the desire to be loved exclusively in our agapic relationships, similar worries do not 
arise. What is to be understood here is that different types of love call for different types of 
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activities characteristic of the relationship. This is why we often have different sets of 
expectations for our beloveds depending on whether we are loving them romantically or 
agapically. We don’t expect people we love agapically, such as our family members, to satisfy us 
sexually. That type of love does not call for that. Further, I am not sure that we expect people 
that we love romantically to love us unconditionally. It is not implausible to think that romantic 
love does not call for this. If we bring harm to our beloved, we can rationally expect them to love 
us less or even in some cases that they love us no longer! Our beloveds do not always stop loving 
us or love us any less when we bring harm to them, but we would understand if they did because 
we understand that there are conditions on which that love depends. 
Our naive understanding of the constancy principle tends to be: 
Naïve Constancy: If x begins to love y romantically at a time t1, then x ought to 
love y romantically at all times after t1; if x’s romantic love ends, it had never 
been love. 
 
But is it plausible that we desire this about constancy in our romantic relationships? If this is 
what we have in mind when we are talking about constancy in our romantic relationships, it 
seems that it will conflict with our desire for exclusivity in the way mentioned earlier. An 
implication of this naïve constancy is that, if Bob ever loved Sally romantically, he should 
always love her romantically even in the circumstances their relationship comes to a halt. How 
might Susan feel when she finds that her beloved Bob was once in love with Sally? This would 
alarm a logically savvy Susan. Susan will be more alarmed if she asks question with a “Are you 
in love with me?” An affirmative response here would go against our intuitions about 
exclusivity. That we desire constancy in this sense is more unreasonable than the consequences 
that might follow from the appraisal view! It leads to a conflict in our desire for stability. But is 
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there a way that we can understand constancy that is consistent with our desires for both 
exclusivity and constancy? I think that there is.  
 I submit that we have in mind an even more refined notion of strict constancy that I will 
call the Principle of Constancy. I will formulate it as follows: 
The Principle of Constancy: A person x ought to romantically love a person y for 
as long as he values the relationship with y or the loveable qualities found 
valuable by x are still had by y (or perceived by x to still be had by y). 
 
This does not require x to continue to love y if y has undergone significant changes or if the 
romantic relationship with y changes in a way for x to no longer value it. I submit that in certain 
cases, a perceived non-trivial change in something like personality might be enough to justify x’s 
belief that indeed y has significantly changed. So, presumably, if x’s love for y ceases when x 
takes y to have changed significantly, the termination of that love does not call into question the 
earlier love of y by x. That is to say that if x no longer loves y when y significantly changes or 
their romantic relationship is no longer valuable to x, the love is gone because the reasons for 
loving y romantically are gone and not because there is some flaw or fault in x’s love.52 Most 
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importantly, though, is that this principle of constancy is compatible with a reason-dependent 
account of romantic love. That is, romantic love is compatible with our principle if x and y are 
rigid in their preferences and properties or if they are continuously flexible. 
 It is plausible that this is the principle that we have in mind when we talk about the 
constancy that we desire in our romantic relationships because it more accurately accommodates 
our language about such matters. We can account for our intuitions about exclusivity better. Z 
will feel more secure with her love for x and in her relationship with x when she finds that x, 
whom she is now in a relationship with two years after x ended the relationship with y, can now 
respond to the question was he ever in love with y. Without compromising exclusivity, x can 
respond affirmatively without also maintaining that he still loves y romantically. 
 Recall the thought that the appraisal account of love leads to the unreasonable 
consequence that the love or the relationship should end when the qualities of the beloved 
change. However, given this understanding of the principle of constancy, the consequences are 
not unreasonable. They might be otherwise than we expected. But if this principle of constancy 
is correct, and I think it is, then something has gone awry in our expectations, not in the love or 
the implications of such love. But there is also the worry that the reason-responsive account of 
love that I affirm recommends short-term loves. 
 This problem is avoided, however, once we understand that the beliefs and wants 
associated with love are not occasional. They vary far too much to be attached to one particular 
occasion or type of instance. Gabriele Taylor writes that the emotional states in virtue of which 
we say that x loves y may, when each is taken in isolation, lack that complexity which is a 
feature of love itself.
53
 The concern over the recommendation of short-term loves is a result of 
                                                 
53
 Taylor (1976), p. 161-2. 
39 
 
 
our linking love with these particular occasions. But on any particular occasion x’s emotional 
state might be (and often is) complex. This state is complex, in large part, because there are 
several things influencing x’s emotional state. On some occasions, x might have this or that 
desire involved in love. Love also, perhaps more than any other emotion, may be responsible for 
x finding himself in any emotional state such as bliss or despair or hope or jealousy.
54
 The 
reason-responsive account of love takes this very complexity into consideration. This 
consideration is hardly a prescription for a short-term love. 
 Last, there is a worry that the reason-responsive account portrays romantic love as far too 
conditional and that this is a concern for the desire for constancy. However, romantic 
relationships are attitude-dependent relationships. Attitude-independent relationships (such as 
familial relationships) can exist without any historical pattern of concern. Whether x is y’s sister 
depends on a biological bond and not on how they feel about one another. For this reason, the 
claim that a person has no reason to care about one’s parents, siblings, and children would be 
illegitimate.
55
 Attitude-dependent relationships refer to the pattern of concern the participants 
have for one another, for the relationship, and for the pattern itself. When people ask us whether 
we have a good relationship with a friend, they are referring to the pattern. Whether or not we 
choose to remain romantically involved with our partners depends heavily on our attitudes about 
these patterns because “a friendship or romantic relationship just is an ongoing pattern of 
concern.”56 If x were to cause emotional harm to y, x might hope for the love to remain the same, 
however, he could not expect this. What is expected is y might love him less or love him no 
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longer. The fact that romantic love is attitude-dependent makes clear the conditional nature of 
romantic love. Its attitude-dependent nature partly contributes to our desire for constancy and the 
value we place on long-term relationships. 
 
Velleman and Exclusivity 
In “Love as a Moral Emotion”, David Velleman begins his discussion by considering 
what Kantian morality requires from us. He says that people misrepresent Kant to sometimes 
mean “equal consideration” in a sense that means “give equal weight to the interests of all.”57 
Velleman suggests that Kant can be instead interpreted to mean that we should give equal 
consideration to the rights of all which may vary in justification, which is dependent on your 
relevant knowledge of a situation. So, he thinks that Kant might be read in a way that lends itself 
to partiality.  
The universializability requirement in Kant raises problems for love. In our clinging to 
our partners we must ask ourselves if we could be rationally justified in our loving our partners 
universally. This is, as Bernard Williams has suggested, one thought too many and it seems to 
count against some of the attitudes we normally associate with loving. That is, the fact that we 
have to ask this universalizability question itself, prima facie, already cuts against partiality.  
Velleman says that some have suggested, as a solution to the problem, that the conscious 
deliberation that seems to be required by Kant should show some credence to love. That, in other 
words, conscious deliberation should occupy merely the background in cases where one’s loved 
ones are in danger. He submits that love is a moral emotion and we should focus on how the two 
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converge.
58
 So if what he has to say is correct, then we should expect that the relationship 
between love and reason should become clearer and produce reasonable consequences for 
romantic love. 
Velleman thinks that he has succeeded in showing the Kantian idea that reverence to the 
law is actually more personal for Kant, since what he means by “good will” is the sort of rational 
essence had by persons. From this, Velleman formulates love by saying, “I am inclined to say 
that love is likewise the awareness of a value inhering in its object; and I am also inclined to 
describe love as an arresting of that awareness of that value.”59 
This is where we encounter the concern for romantic love. If the value that we recognize 
and are arrested by is the “good will”, and indeed he seems to think that it is, then it is something 
that all persons possess. One concern for Velleman is that if everyone has it then we have no way 
to account for the justification question in love—namely what, if anything, justifies my coming 
to love this particular person rather than someone else?
60
 What particularly about this person’s 
value are we responding to? Any of our natural responses to this question, such as a person’s 
humor, Velleman thinks, fails to capture essences, and they are merely accidents. Further, he 
says that this type of response does not refer to value at all for Kant, but rather to what Kant calls 
“price.”61 Instead we are responding only to the value that persons have essentially as persons, 
which involves our capacity to recognize people as also having the capacity to discover rational 
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natures in others and for them to respect that capacity as well. Persons have a dignity that 
amounts to a greater value than the sum of all price for Velleman. 
Velleman derives this Kantian compatible notion of love from Kant’s respect for persons. 
Velleman repeatedly says things like “when we love [someone] as a person—rather than a work 
of nature, say, or an aesthetic object—then indeed, I want to say we are responding to the value 
that he possesses by being a person or, as Kant would say, an instance of rational nature.”62 Or 
“Kant himself believes that each person has a dignity in virtue of his rational nature and hence 
that all persons should be judged to have the same value.”63 But if this is correct then we cannot 
account for the type of partiality involved in romantic love. We cannot say, for instance, why it is 
that we have come to love y romantically and not z, given that my judgment of valuation of these 
individuals should yield equivalent worth. Velleman suggests that on his account “we can judge 
the person to be valuable in generic respects while also valuing her as irreplaceable.”64 But it is 
not quite clear how we might “appreciate someone as irreplaceable” in the context prescribed by 
Velleman in which we are responding to a value that is shared by everyone. As Kolodny puts it, 
“what kind of ‘appreciation’ of one’s beloved as ‘special and irreplaceable’ could be compatible 
with the ‘judgment’ that one has just as much reason to appreciate anyone in that way?” 
Velleman’s account seems to be unable to provide an adequate response to these questions about 
partiality. 
Additionally, Velleman’s account fails to accommodate our desire for exclusivity in 
romantic love as it implies that we love everyone insofar as they possess a rational essence. 
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Given, then, that all of the persons that we encounter possess these essences, Velleman’s 
reasons-responsive account of love implies that we ought to love them all. This implication 
undermines the desire for the type of exclusivity that gives rise to many varieties of satisfaction 
had by those people that receive this exclusivity. It appears that any response available to 
Velleman that might address this concern can only do so in a way that drives the account further 
from Kantian ideals. If we admit that we do, in fact, value our romantic partners in a special way, 
then we would be admitting to valuing one person qua person more than another person. Given 
Velleman’s own interpretation of Kantian commitments, this is an explicit violation of dignity 
had by persons. Although Velleman’s account of love as moral emotion is a type of reasons-
responsiveness account of love, it is an account of love that is more suited to accommodate our 
moral intuitions pertaining to agapic love where our desires for exclusivity are not as strong and 
are not as relevantly pertinent.  
 
Exclusivity 
 Until now, we have been appealing to some prima facie intuitions that we have regarding 
exclusivity in romantic love. We said that we desire to be loved exclusively for a number of 
reasons. But we have not, in the same way as we have gotten clear on what we are talking about 
when we talk about constancy, gotten clear on what we have in mind regarding exclusivity. 
Intuitively, we desire to be loved exclusively; we insist that our lovers love us and no one 
else. We are not happy receiving a love that is extended to persons in addition to ourselves.
65
 
And although the exclusivity condition alone, in any case, does not guarantee that love will be 
attained, it does seem to make its attainability and sustainability more probable. We desire to be 
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loved exclusively “because we believe that the other joys of love, and love itself are put in 
jeopardy when we are not loved exclusively.”66 
 The concept of exclusivity, however, is just as ambiguous as constancy. Similarly, the 
idea that love is exclusive acquires its ambiguity from it being insensitive to time. We need to 
discern whether this notion of exclusivity is timeless (for all time) or timed (at one time). Soble 
holds that “someone who asserts that love is exclusive might mean that x can love one person 
period or that x can only love one person at a time.”67 Now, timeless exclusivity implies that we 
love only once over the span of our lifetime. In other words, “in this sense of exclusivity, (i) after 
xLy begins, x can love no one other than y, and (ii) before xLy begins, x could not have loved 
anyone else.”68 However, it is not clear that this is what we ordinarily mean. Exclusivity, when 
considered as timeless exclusivity, seems to imply that the first object of a person’s romantic 
love is that person’s only beloved. But what about a less strict, timed exclusivity? 
 A looser notion of exclusivity is vastly more compelling and does better at 
accommodating our intuitions about exclusivity. I will formulate the principle of exclusivity as 
follows: 
The Principle of Exclusivity: x ought to only love romantically one person at a 
time. 
So, as long as when x loves y at a time t1, the principle demands that he love only y at t1. If 
however, as in our example, x leaves y and x falls in love with z, this principle has not been 
violated because the love of y by x and the love of z by x occur at times that are temporally 
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discrete. This principle implies that if xLy at t1 and y’s relationship with x ceases, then xLz can 
still be true at a time t2. So, x is allowed to love y and z romantically at different stages of his life. 
Additionally, the principle does not entail that a person’s first beloved is their only beloved as we 
saw was the case with the notion of strict exclusivity. 
  
Romantic Love and Exclusivity 
Exclusivity, how we have presented it here, does not in any fashion conflict with the 
nature of romantic love as a response to an appraisal of value. In fact, if a person realizes that she 
is not being loved in virtue of her prized attributes, how might being loved exclusively make her 
feel special? That is, if her properties have nothing at all to do with the fact that she has been 
chosen to be loved exclusively, probably she will harbor doubts that there exists any reason at all 
to feel special. She may think that she is being treated special (if in fact she is being treated 
special) by her lover for no reason that actually makes her special. Our widespread belief that 
everyone is unique might be representative of a further belief that the quality sets one possesses 
vary, in some way or other, from other people.  
The compatibility of the reasons-responsive theory and our desire for exclusivity in our 
romantic relationships is straightforward. We love our particular beloveds exclusively for the set 
of qualities. Although I do not disagree with Velleman in his claim that all persons have some 
value qua person that grounds our loving them, I, instead doubt whether this is the value that 
grounds our romantic love. The value that we seem to respond to in our romantic relationships is 
to the qualities about the beloved. It is by the appreciation of these qualities that we prize things 
more than others. 
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These qualities help make us unique. There is something special about the way Mary 
laughs or the unrivaled keenness that Joe has. These qualities do not add to the value of the 
beloved qua person but instead, qua beloved. Recall our example of the gold medal earlier. 
Athletes do not desire the gold medal for the value of the gold in the medal, for that is the same 
in every gold medal. But we want this gold medal in this sport because it speaks to our 
particular interests. These interests constitute some value acquired by the gold medal that often 
make it more valuable than just the medal simpliciter. In a similar way, our beloveds are like the 
gold medal. They become more valuable to us as we find that they satisfy our particular interests. 
Velleman takes issue with this. He is not favorable to the idea of uniqueness we 
commonly take ourselves to possess. He says: 
Adults often confuse us further by saying that we’re special because no 
one else is quite like us—as if the valuing attaching to us, and to everyone 
else as well, was that of being qualitatively unique… How valuable can 
our uniqueness make us if everyone is unique? We sense a similar paradox 
in attempts to elicit our childish awe at individual snowflakes, of which 
(they say) no two are alike. Why get excited about any one unprecedented 
snowflake, when its lack of precedence is so well precedented?
69
 
 
But why think this? The fascinating thing about uniqueness is the arrangement and the degree to 
which each quality is being had by our partners. If everyone has a different set, we might instead 
think that this is more reason to rejoice at the fact that there are things about our partners that 
make them special to us. We are reassured that our beloved can be special in virtue of these 
qualities because of the lack of demonstrated duplication of the arrangement of qualities had by 
our beloved. 
 I have said that the quality theory is compatible with our desire for exclusivity. But what 
if the beloved set is duplicated in multiple individuals? Will that not violate our desire for 
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exclusivity in romantic relationships? My response is that while this seems to be a theoretical 
problem, it is not a problem that we have to worry about practically. That there is another person 
that shares exactly the qualities that another person has and in the exact same way is rather 
implausible. But supposing that there were such a case where x and y have only and all the same 
qualities in exactly the same way, it is not immediately clear to me that the exclusivity principle 
would be violated. It requires only that we love one person at a time. 
 To further extend my comments that this theoretical concern is not a practical concern, I 
remind you that that there is more involved than just the appreciation of qualities. In some sense, 
who we love has to do with the fact that there are only a limited amount of people that we come 
in to contact with over our lifetimes. This duplication would not only have to occur, but it would 
have to occur within the scope of eligible candidates of potential beloveds. Again, this seems to 
me to be highly improbable. We should only worry about this concern if it actually threatens the 
possibility of romantic relationships as we now know them. So it appears the quality account 
does indeed accommodate our desires for exclusivity in romantic love. 
 There is another concern for exclusivity. Consider the more realistic situation where two 
people equally possess characteristics (even if not even the same ones) that we value equally. In 
this case x might have a set of qualities Ψ and y might have a set of qualities Φ that yield the 
same value to the lover. The very desire for exclusivity can only tell us that we have to choose 
only one. However, if love is reasons-responsive it does not seem to be able to account for why 
we chose x in favor of y. Further, the argument might be made that an account of love that finds 
its base in something other than qualities better explains why we choose x in favor of y. Another 
account might be able to pick out something more particular to x than Ψ and thus better explain 
the choice. 
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 That love is also the appreciation of the history in a relationship will hardly help us here. 
It can only tell us that x is chosen in favor of y only if there is a relationship to be appreciated 
with x. But if there is no preexisting relationship with x or y this will not suffice. But while both x 
and y appear equally valuable having sets of qualities Ψ and Φ respectively, the way we decide 
often involves our preferences. So while x and y appear equally valuable to us, the reason that we 
choose x in favor of y is that we prefer the way that the value is personified in x in favor of the 
way that it is personified in y. Since x and y have Ψ and Φ respectively, it makes sense that the 
way they demonstrate the perceived value is different. When we choose x in favor of y, we prefer 
the way x demonstrates that value. The reason we choose x and not y is because this preference 
gives us reason to pursue x in favor of y. The desire for exclusivity in a relationship motivates us 
in these situations to find the distinction between x and y and to apply our preferences to those 
distinctions, and we decide on the basis of that. It makes sense that the personification of the 
value is contingent upon the qualities had in the set and to what degree a person has those 
qualities. Further, we might ask ourselves if x and y have Ψ and Φ respectively and they 
demonstrate the value differently, are they equally valuable? This question, I take it, points us 
again toward a mere theoretical concern and not a pragmatic one. Insofar as the value of Ψ and Φ 
will always be demonstrated differently, I deeply question the plausibility of such a concern. 
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Chapter 4: 
A Summing Up 
Since love plays such an important role in our lives, it is important that we study it. 
Earlier we said that knowing what to love aids us in trying to manage our lives sensibly—it aids 
us in deciding how to live. In a way, loving helps make our otherwise meaningless activity 
purposeful. The reasons we have for coming to love someone do not dictate that we should love 
a person; rather they are reasons or considerations in favor of or against doing so. Our romantic 
relationships are important because they provide us with a final ends—such as the beloved 
herself, the beloveds interests, and stability for our romantic relationships—to aim for.  
We have worked tediously to develop an account of romantic love. We have worked to 
show that romantic love involves the response to reasons given to us by the qualities had by the 
beloved as well as the reasons given to us by our romantic relationships themselves. We said that 
romantic love is the valuing of the qualities had by our partners as well as the appreciation of a 
relationship from the perspective of the participants in that relationship, and the valuing of one’s 
beloved. 
Later in we worked to get clearer on the ideal of stability. Stability is the ideal that we 
strive for in our romantic relationships. We said that stability can be broken into two constituent 
parts—our desires for constancy and exclusivity. We desire constancy because maintaining a 
strong sense of object constancy helps us bypass emotions that bring us to grief. We desire 
exclusivity because we like to feel special and we realize that our lovers have only a finite 
amount of resources to give. We found that all we mean by constancy is that a person 
romantically loves another person for as long as he values the romantic relationship with that 
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person or the qualities found valuable are still had by that person. We said that when it comes to 
exclusivity we mean only that a person can love romantically only one person at a time. 
Insofar as our romantic relationships fulfill these criteria, they are loving relationships 
that are stable. That is, insofar as our romantic relationships involve the valuation and 
appreciation of qualities had by the beloved and the valuation of our relationships and 
appropriate responses to the reasons they give us, they are stable romantic relationships. The 
account provided here, I believe, can best account for the emotional vulnerabilities that we 
experience in our romantic relationships as well as intuitions regarding partiality in romantic 
relationships. 
At the beginning of this project, I mentioned that a primary goal of this project would be 
to bridge the gap between love and reason. The relationship between them, I hope, is a bit 
clearer. I am not, by any means, proclaiming that this account of love is adequate to account for 
everything that has been called love throughout the course of time. I am however, saying that I 
take this account to have made some progress in clearing the viscous haze surrounding romantic 
love. And for that, I believe, we are better off. 
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